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"TRUE PRIVATE CHOICE" OR A "HOBSON'S
CHOICE?:" RE-THINKING ZELMAN V.
SIMMONS-HARRIS IN NORTH CAROLINA'S

OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
KristopherL. Caudle*

I. INTRODUCTION

"Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce
bad law."] This familiar legal principle is ordinarily invoked when a
sympathetic judge offers a "strained interpretation of the law ' 2 to avoid a
harsh impact on an individual. But, while sympathetic judges may serve
justice or equity of the moment, stare decisis outlasts sympathy and
"hard cases" typically prove to be difficult for general application
because the judge's "immediate overwhelming
interest...appeals to the
3
judgment.,
the
distorts
and
feelings
Perhaps no modem First Amendment
case .illustrates
this
•
4
principle more aptly than Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, where the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Ohio's controversial
Pilot Project Scholarship Program ("Pilot Program"), which enabled
eligible parents to use "school vouchers" at qualifying public or private
schools of their choice, violated the Establishment Clause. The Pilot
* Juris-Doctor, University of North Carolina School of Law, Class of 2015;
Executive Editor, FirstAmendment Law Review, Volume 13.
1.See Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.) 405. Judge
Rolfe wrote the majority opinion in Winterbottom and is often credited as the first
jurist to lay down the principle in print. See generally Michael Davis & Andrew
Stark, Conflicts in Rulemaking: Hard Cases andBad Law, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST
INTHE PROFESsIoNs, 4 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001).
2. NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL

REASONING 49 (2005).
3. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
4. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
5. Id.at 639 (majority opinion).
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Program was enacted in response to an "unprecedented" education crisis
within Cleveland's inner city schools, prompting Justice Souter to
observe that "[i]f there were an excuse for giving short shrift to the
Establishment Clause, it would probably apply here." 6 Ultimately, in a
split decision, a sympathetic majority held that the Pilot Program was not
a violation of the Establishment Clause, even though roughly 96% of all
participants in the Pilot Program used their voucher at private Catholics
schools.
Over a decade later, the holding in Zelman remains controversial
for a myriad of reasons. First, Zelman disregarded a swath of existing
First Amendment doctrine and single-handedly approved the greatest
expansion in government aid to religious schools in the Court's history.'
Second, the majority's "true private choice" test largely ignores the
realities of modem education 9 and often leaves parents with no "true"
choice but only a "Hobson's Choice" for the education of their child.'0
6. Id.
at 685 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7. Cf infra Part III (analyzing the Supreme Court's religious school aid
jurisprudence from 1940-2002, culminating in the Court's decision in Zelman) and
infra Part V.B.3 (analyzing the implications on the Zelman's Court's disregard of the
"entanglement" and "indoctrination" prongs used in Agostini to analyze a
government program's "effect" on religion).
8. In "direct-aid" cases, the Court has set firm limiting principles on the
amount of money that can reach religious institutions. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000) (noting that federal funds could only supplement
nonfederal funding sources); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 210 (1997) (federally
funded services could "supplement, and in no case supplant, the level of services"
that were already provided). In "in-direct aid" cases, the amount of aid conferred
may be substantial to the recipient but it was nominal to the "bottom-line" of the
religious institution receiving the benefit and the aggregate religious interest in the
state. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489
(1986) (one student received handicapped aid to attend a religious seminary
institution); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,13-14 (1993) (one
student received aid for sign-language interpreter at a private religious school).
9. See infra Part lIl.D (analyzing the Zelman Court's rationale for the "true
private choice" test).
10. Oxford's dictionary defines a "Hobson's Choice" as "[a] choice of taking
what is available or nothing at all." THE NEW OXFORD DICTIONARY 803 (2d. ed.
2005). In his Zelman dissent, Justice Souter argued that in the voucher context "true
private choice" is eviscerated by practical factors such as income and demographics,
leaving Cleveland parents with very little choice, or as he phrased it, a "Hobson's
Choice." See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra Part
III.D.3 and Part V.B.2.
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Finally, Zelman's utility remains questionable.' Since Zelman, the Court
has not granted certiorari in another voucher case and the expansive "true
private choice" test has never been applied outside of the unique facts in
Zelman. 12Accordingly, many opportunistic state legislatures continue to
press constitutional boundaries in the development of their own voucher
laws.I

North Carolina is the latest battleground in the debate. In the
summer of 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly approved a
budget bill that provides "Opportunity Scholarships" of up to $4,200 for
qualifying low-income students to use at "non-public" schools within the
state.14 Although the word "voucher" is noticeably absent in the program,

11. See, e.g., David M. Powers, The PoliticalIntersection of School Choice,
Race, and Values, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1051, 1060-63 (2009); Isabel Chou,
"Opportunity"for All?: How Tax Credit Scholarships Will Fare in New Jersey, 64
RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 310 (2011) ("Nevertheless, with four justices dissenting and
critics calling out the Court's inconsistency, it may only be a matter of time before
the issue returns to the Supreme Court."). See also Jason S. Marks, What Wall?
School Vouchers and Church-State SeparationAfter Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 58
J. Mo. B. 354 (2002) (discussing the breakdown of the first amendment after
Zelman); Elizabeth A. Marino, Comment, Constitutional Law-School Voucher
Programs Providing Access to Private Religious Schools Do Not Violate the
Establishment Clause-Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), 37 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1243 (2004).
12. Although the "true private choice" test has never been applied in another
voucher case, by implication, the test has become a staple of the Roberts Court's
hands off approach to public prayer, especially Legislative Prayer. See, e.g., Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S._ 134 S.Ct. 2811 (2014) (holding that the Town
of Greece was not constitutionally prohibited from opening its meetings with prayer
because the prayers were optional). See generally Scott Gaylord, When the
Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian Legislative Prayer PostSummum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1066-67 (2011) (relying on Zelman to argue
that the frequency of particular prayers are unimportant in the legislative prayer
inquiry because they are simply a product of demographics beyond the court's
reach).
13. See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d
933, 944 (Colo. 2004) (finding Colorado's voucher program unconstitutional under
Colorado state law); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 413 (Fla. 2006) (holding that
Florida's voucher program violated the Florida Constitution's educational uniformity
clause).
14. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-562.1-562.7 (2013); see also infra Parts
III.A-B (tracing the legislative history of North Carolina's Opportunity Scholarship
Program and explaining the mechanics of the statute).
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North Carolina's "Opportunity Scholarships" are analogous to the Pilot
Program at issue in Zelman, as well as similar voucher legislation
enacted in 39 other states around the country. 15 Like other states, North
the voucher legislation on
challenged
Carolina's citizens immediately
•
16
constitutional grounds in state court.
Although state law may ultimately resolve North Carolina's
voucher dispute altogether, this paper seeks to address the issues a future
plaintiff might face in bringing a federal Establishment Clause challenge
to a contemporary voucher program under a post-Zelman regime. 17 To
lay the proper foundation, Part II briefly demarcates the educational
policy debate surrounding vouchers and "school choice." Part III traces
the historical development of government aid to religious schools in the
Supreme Court, and includes a detailed analysis of the conflicting
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in Zelman. Part IV analyzes
the legislative history, mechanics and implementation of North
Carolina's voucher legislation. Part V then argues that North Carolina's
Opportunity Scholarship Program ("O.S.P.") violates the Establishment
Clause in two respects: it fails Zelman's "true private choice" test and its
15. See Ed Choice 101: Facts, AMERICAN FEDERATION FOR CHILDREN,
http://www.federationforchildren.org/ed-choice-101/facts (last visited December 11,
2014 8:37am). For a state-by-state comparison on voucher programs around the
country, see School Voucher Laws: State-by-State Comparison, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES

(last visited December 11, 2014 8:37am),

http://www.ncsl.org/
research/education/voucher-law-comparison.aspx;, http://www.ncsi.org/research/
education/voucher-law-comparison.aspx.
16. See Amended Complaint, Hart v. North Carolina, (December 11, 2013)
(No. 13-CVS- 16771) availableat http://www.ncae.org/wp-content/uploads/
Vouchers-Complaint-Final.pdf [hereinafter "Hart Complaint"]; Complaint for
Declatory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Richardson v. North Carolina (Dec. 16,
2013) (No. 13-CVS-16484), availableat http://www.ncsba.org/clientuploads/
DocumentsPDF/13Complaint.pdf [hereinafter "Richardson Complaint"].
17. This paper relies on the working assumption that the North Carolina
Supreme Court will uphold the voucher law under the North Carolina Constitution
and a North Carolina citizen or advocacy group will pursue further litigation in
federal court, a prediction already made by Professor Gene Nichol. See Gene Nichol,

Gene Nichol: Law takes a beating in NC voucher saga,

RALEIGH NEWS AND

2014,
21,
June
http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/06/21/3952326/gene-nichol-law-takes-abeating.html.
law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/publications/lawtakesabeatinginncvouchersaga.pdf.
OBSERVER,
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"effects" raise additional "entanglement" concerns that were not at issue
in Zelman but are still constitutionally significant to the advancement of
religion under the First Amendment.
I. VOUCHER POLICY AND SCHOOL CHOICE
In its simplest form, a school voucher is a certificate of funding
issued by a state for the benefit of an eligible student enrolled at a
qualified educational institution of the parent's choice.18 Whether such a
scheme makes for sound public policy has become a lightning rod for
debate in the era of de-segregation following Brown v. Board of
Education.19

Proponents present a mixture "of market and non-market
rationales" to support the implementation of school vouchers. 2 From a
market perspective, proponents cite the works of Milton Friedman, an
economist who coined the term "voucher" during the 1950's. 21 Friedman
argued that the monopolistic features of public education bred
complacency 22 and like businesses, public education could boost its
efficiency if supply and demand principles were introduced into the
education marketplace.2 3 Therefore, Friedman proposed offering parents
a government credit, or a "voucher," for use as tuition at the school of
their choice, forcing public
schools to compete with private institutions
24
for student enrollment. From a non-market perspective, proponents also
contend that empirical studies suggest educational outcomes are

18. Academics formally define the term "voucher" as "an entitlement extended
to an individual by government permitting that individual to receive educational
services up to the maximum dollar amount specified." See THOMAS L. GOOD &
JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: CHOICE, VOUCHERS, AND

CHARTERS 90-91 (2000) (quoting AUSTIN D. SWANSON & RICHARD A. KING,
SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 414 (2d ed. 1997)).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that state laws permitting "separate but
equal" treatment in educational facilities violate the 14th Amendment).
20. Chou, supra note 11, at 298.
21. See id. at 298-99 (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
93-100 (1962)).
22. See id. (citing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 93-98
("competition cannot be relied on to protect the interests of parents and children.")).
23. See id.
24. See id.
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enhanced when parents are given more autonomy to tailor instruction to
meet their child's needs.25 Likewise, enhanced autonomy over instruction
also bolsters the transmission of important cultural and social values to
26
children, especially in predominately minority communities.
Conversely, North Carolina opponents argue that voucher
programs, while benefiting some, "transfer public funds to unaccountable
private schools"' 27 and reduce the overall amount of funding available for
public education.28 As a result, students are denied a "sound basic
education: ' '29 a fundamental goal of state and local government,
guaranteed by North Carolina's Constitution.30 Opponents also argue that
voucher programs are ripe for fraud and abuse 3 1 and where implemented
32
the achievement gap, a stated goal of North
have done little to reduce
33
Carolina's voucher law.
Notwithstanding strong policy arguments on the right and the
left, school vouchers also raise constitutional concerns. As Part III
explores, because school vouchers inherently require the transfer of
public funds to private individuals, many of whom use their entitlement
at private religious schools, the argument continues to be made that

25. See id. at 299 (citing JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE:
LIMITS OF THE MARKET METAPHOR 15-16 (1994)).

26. See id. (citing JEFFREY R. HENIG, RETHINKING SCHOOL CHOICE: LIMITS OF
THE MARKET METAPHOR 16 (1994)).
27. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 4, Hart v. North Carolina (Jan. 30 2014) (No. 13-CVS-16771) (on-file
with author).
28. Id. at 4-9.
29. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336 (1997) (holding that the North Carolina
Constitution required the State to provide every student "a sound basic education").

30. Id.
31. Lindsay Wagner, School Vouchers: A Pathway towards Fraudand Abuse
of Taxpayer Dollars,NCPOLICYWATCH.COM (April 24, 2013), http://
www.ncpolicywatch.com/2013/04/24/school-vouchers-a-pathway-toward-fraud-andabuse-of-taxpayer-dollars.
32. Matthew Ellinwood, Education Policy Perspectives: Public Money for
Private Schools, Policy Brief: NORTH CAROLINA JUSTICE CENTER (April 24, 2013),
http://www.ncjustice.org/?q=education/education-policy-perspectives-publicmoney-private-schools.
33. See infra Part V.A.
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vouchers unfairly advance
religion and violate the First Amendment's
34
Establishment Clause.
III. THE ZEL MAN DOCTRINE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. 35 However, for the first half of United States history,
Establishment Clause principles were foreclosed to direct application
36
among the states. But, once the First Amendment became applicable to
the states37 through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
gradually heard more Establishment Clause cases, which in turn
significantly expanded the doctrine. 38 As Parts III A, B, and C
demonstrate, in the context of government aid to private religious
schools, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has vacillated greatly over
the last half century.
A. Early Cases
In Everson v. Board of Education 39 Justice Black, writing for the
majority, articulated what is still considered
to be the "modem
40
conception" of the Establishment Clause:
34. See, e.g., Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944 (Me. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1051 (2006) (upholding the validity of a Maine tuition payment
statute, finding it neither improperly infringed on the free exercise of religion nor
violated the Establishment Clause in an action brought by parents electing to send
their children to private religious schools that did not qualify as nonsectarian schools
for payment of tuition with public funds).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

36. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause

provisions to the states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("[T]he
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.") (internal citation omitted).
37. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
38. See generally Kristopher L. Caudle, Note, Unanswered Prayers: Lund v.
Rowan County and the Permissiveness of Sectarian Prayer in Municipalities, 12
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 625, 633 (2014) (framing the historical context of a modem
Establishment Clause inquiry).
39. 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947) (majority opinion).
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The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another....
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.4 '
In Everson, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute that gave local governments discretion to re-imburse
parents for the costs of transporting their children to school on "regular
buses operated by the public transportation system., 4' Because reimbursement was funded from taxpayer dollars and part of the funds
went to parents of children educated at Catholic parochial schools, a
taxpayer alleged that the program violated the Establishment Clause.4 3 In
its opinion, the majority acknowledged some First Amendment tension
with the scheme" but ultimately reasoned that the Establishment Clause
was no bar to "a general program to help parents get their children,
regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools. ' '45 Therefore, even though some public funds reached
Catholic parochial schools, since the program was designed to benefit all
parents neutrally, regardless of religion, it did not violate the
Establishment Clause.46

40. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 687 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
41. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 16 ("New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of
an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand,
other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its
citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.").
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 17.
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47

Similarly, in Board of Education v. Allen, the Court upheld a
New York statute that required school boards to loan textbooks to
students at private religious schools. 4' Relying on Everson, the Court
made no distinction between government aid available for student
transportation and textbooks made available for student instruction.49
Like the statute in Everson, the New York statute in Allen provided for a
general program not to advance religion but instead to advance a secular
purpose: the "furtherance of the educational opportunities available to
the young. ' 50 However, the Allen Court was careful to note the statute
did not "authorize the loan of religious books, 5 and all textbooks
required approval by local authorities such that only secular books could
52
receive approval.
Unlike Everson and Allen,53 where government aid was funneled
to parents and students, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4 the Court unanimously
struck down a Pennsylvania statute on Establishment Clause grounds
because the statute provided a direct 15% salary supplement to teachers
in non-public schools.55 Likewise, the Lemon Court's Establishment
Clause holding largely turned on the "excessive entanglement" between
government and religion that would necessarily result when teachers
accepted direct salary supplements to teach secular subjects at private
56
religious schools.
Ultimately, the Lemon Court combined Everson and Allen to
articulate a workable analysis under the Establishment Clause.5 7 To
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny under the Lemon test, a
47. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
48. See id. at 242-43.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 243.
51. Id. at 244.
52. Id. at 244-45.
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971) ("In Allen the Court refused
to make assumptions, on a meager record, about the religious content of the
textbooks that the State would be asked to provide. We cannot, however, refuse here
to recognize that teachers have a substantially different ideological character from
books.").
54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
55. Id. at 606-08. The Court also noted that nearly 95% of teachers that
received the salary supplement were employed by Catholic Schools. Id.
56. Id. at 614.
57. Id. at 612-13.
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government aid program: (1) "must have a secular legislative purpose;"
(2) "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion;" and (3) the policy "must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' 58 To determine whether an
"entanglement" is "excessive," a court must evaluate the "character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government
and the religious authority."' 9 While the Lemon Test has not achieved
universal application in Establishment Clause cases, 60 as Parts III B and
C explain, Lemon's three-prong analysis and its permutations 61 continue
to guide the constitutional inquiry in cases where government aid reaches
religious schools.
B. Lessonsfrom Lemon: Forming the "Direct" and "In-direct"
Distinction
The lessons from Lemon were crucial in distinguishing "directaid" from "in-direct aid" during the 1970's and 1980's. In a line of cases
following Lemon, the Court applied the three-prong Lemon test to
invalidate numerous government programs that, like Lemon, provided
"direct aid" to religious schools.

58. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
59. Id. at 615.
60. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (noting that the Lemon Test
was "no more than helpful signposts" in interpreting the Establishment Clause).
Justice Scalia has been the most colorful critic in the application of the Lemon test.
See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 39798 (1993) (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Like some ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of
Center Moriches Union Free School District.").
61. Since Lemon, the Court has folded the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon
test into the "effects" prong. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997). As
Justice O'Connor noted in Zelman, "[t]his made sense because both inquiries rely on
the same evidence, [] and the degree of entanglement has implications for whether a
statute advances or inhibits religion." Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
668-69 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
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1. Direct Aid Cases
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyguist 62 the Court held that a New York statute providing direct money
grants to private schools "for the 'maintenance and repair of... school
facilities . . .,,63 violated the Establishment Clause because it subsidized
64
religious activities and had the primary effect of advancing religion.
65
Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania
statute •which
allowed the State to loan "instructional materials and
,,66
equipment
directly to qualifying private religious schools. Because the
loans were made directly to the school, as opposed to the loans in Allen
(which were made to a parent or student), and 75% of the loans went to
private religious schools, 67 the Court held that the statute had the primary
effect of advancing religion and therefore failed the first prong of the
68
Lemon test.
Finally, in both Aguilar v. Felton,69 and School District of the
City of GrandRapids v. Ball,70 the Court followed the logic in Meek and

62. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
63. Id.at 762. The Court found that the stated purpose of New York's
statute-a concern for the health and safety of students in poorly maintained
building-was a valid secular purpose under Lemon. Id. at 773.
64. Id.at 774.
65. 421 U.S. 349 (1975)), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793

(2000).
66. Id.at 354. Under the statute 'Instructional materials' are defined to
include periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings, films, 'or any other
printed and published materials of a similar nature.' 'Instructional equipment,' ...
includes projection equipment, recording equipment, and laboratory equipment." Id.
at 354-55. However, it "would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular
educational functions from the predominantly religious role performed by many of
Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary schools and to then
characterize Act 195 as channeling aid to the secular without providing direct aid to
the sectarian." id.at 365.
67. Id.at 364.
68. Id.at 363.
69. 473 U.S. 402 (1985) overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(holding that New York's use of federal Title I aid to pay public school teachers to
instruct private religious school students was a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
70. 473 U.S. 373, 393 (1985) overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997) (holding that the shared time and community resources program which
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struck down New York's Title I program and Pennsylvania's "Shared
Time" program because they too had the primary effect of advancing
religion. In addition, maintenance of the programs in these cases required
"excessive entanglement" between the government and religion,
violating the third prong of Lemon."
2. In-direct Aid Cases
Conversely, in another line of cases following Lemon, the Court
took a different approach when government aid reached religious
institutions "in-directly" through the private and independent choices of
some, or many, individual recipients of government aid.
72
In Mueller v. Allen, the Court upheld a Minnesota statute
73
allowing citizens to deduct "tuition, textbooks and transportation,
expenses incurred by parents in their state income tax return, even
though statistical evidence tended to show that the vast majority of
parents claiming the deduction enrolled their children in private religious
schools.74 Applying the Lemon test, the Court reasoned that Minnesota's
tax deduction had a valid secular purpose and did not have the "primary
effect" of advancing religion because it was only one of many deductions
available under Minnesota's tax laws and it could be claimed by all
parents, whether their children were enrolled in public school, sectarian
or non-sectarian private schools. 7 ' Thus, Minnesota's program was
neutral because the benefits likely to inure to religious interests were

provided the classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms
located in and leased from nonpublic schools had the 'primary or principal' effect
of advancing religion and therefore violate[dI dictates of the establishment clause of
the First Amendment.").
71. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413; Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
72. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
73. Id.at 391.
74. Id.at 401-02. The Petitioners in Mueller also pointed out that even though
the statute applied to all parents, the benefits to a parent with a child in public school
were "negligible in value," in that, parents of public school children had little to no
tuition expenses to claim as a deduction. Id.
75. Id. at 400-02. The Mueller Court also found with relative ease that the
Minnesota statute fulfilled the other remaining prongs of the Lemon test. See id.at
394-95 (valid secular purpose), 403-04 (entanglement prong).
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"attenuated" and only resulted by the independent choices of private
citizens.76
Three years after Mueller, the Court reached substantially the
same result in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind.77 In Witters, a Washington statute authorized funding to assist
"visually handicapped" students in achieving vocational, secondary, or
higher education degrees within the State. 78 The petitioner, Larry Witters
qualified to receive assistance under the statute but was denied because
he planned to use the entitlement as tuition at a private seminary
school. 79 As in Mueller, the Court applied the Lemon test and found no
Establishment Clause violation because tuition money was transferred to
Mr. Witters personally and whether the aid was directed to a sectarian or
non-sectarian institution was considered his private and independent
choice. 80 However, the Witters Court made an important distinction that
was only implicit in Mueller's rationale: the amount of money expended
to any individual recipient under the statute would only be expected to
nominally advance religious interest as a whole."
Finally, the Court applied the logic in Mueller and Witters to
uphold a similar Establishment Clause challenge in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District.82 In Zobrest, a deaf student requested the use of
a sign-language interpreter at a private religious school." When the
school district denied the request, Zobrest's parents brought suit alleging,
inter alia, that use of state funds for the purposes of retaining an
interpreter was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. 84 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the statute authorizing sign-language
interpreters was designed primarily to assist in the education of
handicapped students, not to benefit religious interests. 85 In that light,
any financial benefits accruing to the school were "incidental" and
merely a product of the parent's private and independent choice to send
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 400-01.
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 483-84.
See id at 487-89.

Id.
509 U.S. 1(1993).

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 11-12.
Id.
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their child to a religious school when other non-religious public school
options were available. 86 Moreover, the physical presence of an
interpreter assisting in the sectarian education of a recipient alone was
not enough to raise a constitutional issue in itself under the
87
Establishment Clause.
C. Re-Designing Lemon's EntanglementProng
With the assistance of the Lemon test, by the late 1990's, the
Supreme Court's government aid to religious school doctrine seemed to
settle into two discrete categories on opposite ends of the Establishment
Clause spectrum: "direct-aid" and "in-direct aid." On the "direct-aid" end
of the spectrum, cases like Lemon, Nyquist, Meek, Aguilar, and Ball
violated Lemon because government money grants or benefits made inkind were provided directly to religious institutions. On the "in-direct
aid" end of the spectrum, cases like Everson, Allen, Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest did not violate Lemon because government aid only reached
religious schools in-directly, through the private genuine and
independent choices of individuals. Then, the Court decided Agostini v.
Felton" and Mitchell v. Helms, 89 two cases that overturned prior
precedent, blurred the direct/in-direct aid distinction and paved the way
for the majority's holding in Zelman.
In Agostini, the Court was asked to revisit the same Title I
program it held to be unconstitutional in Aguilar. In Aguilar, New
York's implementation of Title I, which allowed public school teachers
to provide remedial instruction in private religious schools, was deemed9
test. '
to violate the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon
However, in light of the Court's recent holdings in Witters and Zobrest,92
the Court granted certiorari pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(5) and overturned Aguilar, holding that implementation of Title I
services at private religious schools was not an Establishment Clause
86. Id. at 12-13.

87. Id. at 13-14.
88. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
89.
90.
91.
92.

530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
See id.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997).
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violation because it was rendered "on a neutral basis" and adequate
"safeguards" were in place to prevent excessive entanglement of
93
government and religion.
In reaching this result, the Agostini Court modified the Lemon
test, collapsing the "excessive entanglement" prong into a broader
determination of a government program's general "effect" on the
advancement of religion. 94 In their opinion, the Agostini Court stated that
a government aid program might violate the "effects" prong if it: (1) was
likely to lead to "governmental indoctrination," (2) "defme[d] its
recipients by reference to religion," or (3) created
an "excessive
95
religion.
and
government
the
between
entanglement"
While the majority in Agostini focused primarily on the
"indoctrination" prong of the "effects" test to resolve the case,96
"excessive entanglement" was still relevant to the Court's decision. 97
Indeed, the Court articulated three additional "entanglement" factors that
courts should take into consideration when judging establishment clause
violations: (1) whether the government program required "pervasive
monitoring by public authorities," (2) whether the government program
required "administrative cooperation[] between [a government agency]
and parochial schools," and (3) whether
"the program might increase the
98
divisiveness."
"political
of
dangers
Within this framework, the Agostini Court primarily focused on
"pervasive monitoring."' 99 The Court determined that Aguilar rested on
93. See id.at 234-35.
94. See id. at 233 ("it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant
and treat it... as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect.").
95. Id.at 234.
96. See id.
97. See id.at 233-35.
98. See id.at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See id.As to the other two prongs of "excessive entanglement," the
Agostini Court held that "administrative cooperation" and "political divisiveness"
were "insufficient by themselves to create an 'excessive' entanglement" because
they were "present no matter where Title 1 services [were] offered, and no court
[had] held that Title I services cannot be offered off campus." Id.at 233-34 (citing
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 425 (1985) (limiting holding to on-premises
services); Walker v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir.
1995) (same); Pulido v. Cavazos, 934 F.2d 912, 919-920 (8th Cir. 1991); Comm. for
Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Sec'y, United States Dept. of Ed., 942 F.Supp.
842 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (same)) (alteration in original).
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the false assumption that public school employees would, as a matter of
law, naturally "inculcate religion" when teaching in private schools and
that "pervasive monitoring" would be required to assure Establishment
Clause compliance, necessitating an "excessive entanglement" between
government and religion. 10 0 Ultimately, Agostini retreated from this
position, noting that Zobrest abandoned the presumption relied on in
Aguilar,' that teachers had no financial incentive to "modify their
religious beliefs" 10 2 and that there was no reason pervasive monitoring
for Title I teachers was required under the Establishment Clause.103
However, the holding in Agostini does not suggest that pervasive
monitoring would never be necessary to control a government aid
scheme, only that it was not requiredby the Establishment Clause in the
context of Title I servicesi °4
Three years after Agostini, the Court decided Mitchell v.
Helms,105 a religious aid case similar to the facts of Allen and Meek. °6 In
Helms, educational supplies such as library and multi-media equipment
were loaned to public and private religious schools to implement
"secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs. 0 7 In a plurality opinion,
the Helms Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the
overturned Meek, largely because the principle cases relied upon byS.108
respondents were either overturned or called into question by Agostini.
The plurality began their opinion by reflecting on the
implications of the holding in Agostini.1°9 First, the plurality
acknowledged Agostini's re-design of the Lemon test, noting the shift

100. See id.at 234.
101. See id.at 225.
102. See id.at 230-32 (referring to Title I services: "This incentive is not
present . . where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that
neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.").
103. See id.at 226-27 ("Certainly, no evidence has ever shown that any New
York City Title I instructor teaching on parochial school premises attempted to
inculcate religion in students.").
104. See id.
105. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
106. See supra notes 45-50, 63, and 65-68 and accompanying text.
107. Helms, 530 U.S. at 831 (plurality opinion).
108. See id. at 835.
109. See id.at 807-37.
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from Lemon's traditional three-prong analysis to a broader two-step
"purpose" and "effect" analysis.110 Second, the plurality recognized the
utility of the three primary criterion of Agostini's "effects" prong:
religious indoctrination, description by religion, and excessive
entanglement."' More importantly, however, the plurality noted that
only the first two criterions of Agostini's "effects" prong applied to the
facts before them in Helms.'1 As a result, the excessive entanglement
1 3
element of the "effects" prong played no part in the plurality's holding,
and the bulk of the "effects" inquiry focused on governmental
indoctrination.'

14

As to indoctrination, the plurality relied heavily on the Court's
rationale in Agostini, holding that "whether . . . aid . . . results in

governmental indoctrination" was "ultimately a question [of] whether
any religious indoctrination" occurring in the schools "could reasonably
be attributed to governmental action."' 5 Moreover, to determine
indoctrination the Court explained that it "consistently turned to the
principle of neutrality,"'1 6 and where government aid was conferred as "a
result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals,"
no indoctrination was attributable to the State."' Furthermore, the
plurality reasoned that the principles embedded in their indoctrination

110. Id.at 807-808.
111. Id. at 808.
112. Id.
113. In Helms, the plaintiffs did not allege an "excessive entanglement"
violation. Id. at 808. Moreover, the Helms Court recognized that the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence had "pared somewhat the factors that
could justify a finding of excessive entanglement." Id. As a result, this element of
the "effects" test has been largely marginalized by the indoctrination element. See

infra Part V.B.2(b).
114. The second criterion of Agostini's "effects" test requires a court to
consider whether an aid program "define[s] its recipients by reference to religion."
Helms, 530 U.S. at 808 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)). The
Helms Court largely blended their analysis of this prong into their analysis of
indoctrination. Id. at 813 ("Agostini's second primary criterion for determining the
effect of governmental aid is closely related to the first . . . this second criterion
looks to the same set of facts as does our focus, under the first criterion, on
neutrality.") (alteration in original).
115. See id. at 809.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 810.
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analysis, mainly neutrality and private choice, made the "direct" and "in118 all but
direct" labels that were critical under the 9 Lemon test
1
test."
meaningless under the re-formed Agostini
Although Helms was only a plurality, the Court's holding was
critical to the outcome in Zelman for two reasons. First, the Court
affirmed the re-design of the Lemon test, 12° applying the same test from
Agostini that the majority applied in Zelman.12 1 Second, the plurality
bolstered the aggregate rationale of Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and
Agostini, 122 a line of cases that greatly influenced the majority's
in Zelman. 123
development of the "true private choice" test
D. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Although governmental aid cases flooded the Supreme Court
docket in the second half of the twentieth century, the constitutionality of
school vouchers remained an open question until 2001 when the Court
granted certiorari in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.124 But, given that the
Court had only incrementally advanced the doctrine through its in-direct
aid line of cases, and that Helms, the most recent religious school aid
case, was only a plurality opinion, where vouchers would fall on the

118. Compare supra Part I1I.A (tracing the Supreme Court's development of
the Lemon Test) and Part 11.B (illustrating how the Court demarcated cases under
the Lemon doctrine based on whether the government aid was "direct" or "in-direct")
with Part I1I.C (explaining how Agostini's "purpose and effect" test shifted the
inquiry away from this dual distinctions).
119. Helms, 530 U.S. at 815-16 ("Although some of our earlier cases,
particularly Ball, . . . did emphasize the distinction between direct and indirect aid,
the purpose of this distinction was merely to prevent 'subsidization' of religion ....
As even the dissent all but admits,. . . our more recent cases address this purpose not
through the direct/indirect distinction but rather through the principle of private
choice, as incorporated in the first Agostini criterion (i.e., whether any indoctrination
could be attributed to the government).").
120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
121. See infra Part III.D.
122. See Helms, 530 U.S. at 810-11 (plurality opinion) ("The principles of
neutrality and private choice, and their relationship to each other, were prominent
not only in Agostini ... but also in Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller.") (alteration in
original).
123. See infra Part IlI.D.
124. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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Court's newly re-designed Establishment Clause spectrum remained
uncertain. Zelman's 5-4 opinion was widely debated among the Court
and ultimately proved unsatisfying to members of the dissent looking
beyond the sympathetic facts in Cleveland and towards the prospective
application of the majority's rule. Thus, to begin the analysis, a brief
overview of the factual narrative in Zelman is necessary.
For decades Cleveland's inner city school system was
consistently ranked as one of the worst performing school systems in the
country, failing to a degree "perhaps unprecedented in the history of
American education." ' 125 Most of the 75,000 children living in Cleveland
were from "low-income and minority" families who lacked the
appropriate resources to send their children to better performing schools
outside of the inner city. 126 In response, the Ohio Legislature approved
funding for the Pilot Program, 127 which was designed to enhance the
educational opportunities of low-income families with28 children attending
public schools in the Cleveland City School District.1
The Pilot Program offered two forms of assistance for eligible
' Under the first option, parents
parents: "tuition aid" or "tutorial aid."129
could accept "tuition aid [for their child] .. . to attend a participating
public or private school" of their choice.13 The amount of tuition aid
available was determined by need, but families falling below 200% of
the poverty
line were given priority and could receive up to $2,250 per
131
year. Under the Pilot Program, tuition aid could be used inside or
outside of the Cleveland City School district. Inside the district, parents
could use tuition aid at a religious or non-religious private school, as well

125. Id. at 644. To avoid hyperbole, the Zelman Court specifically noted the
disparity between Cleveland City Schools and other comparable Ohio Schools. Id.
When the lawsuit was commenced Cleveland's schools failed to meet "18 state
standards for minimal acceptable performance," more than two-thirds of all
Cleveland students failed to graduate high school, and only I in 10 ninth graders
"could pass a basic proficiency examination." Id.
126. Id. at 644.
127. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (West 2013).
128. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
129. Id. at 645 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.975(B), (C)(1) (West
2013)).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 646.
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as public community or magnet school. 3 2 Additionally, parents were
given the option of using tuition aid at adjacent public schools outside of
the district. 133 As a condition to participation in the Pilot Program, all
schools accepting vouchers agreed, "not to discriminate on the basis of
race, religion, or ethnic background, or to 'advocate or foster unlawful
basis of race,
behavior or teach hatred of any person
134 or group on the
ethnicity, national origin, or religion.'
Alternatively, parents could accept "tutorial aid" for their child
to remain enrolled in their current public school and receive personal
education assistance from a state certified tutor.1 35 Ultimately, where
parents directed their aid was solely a product of their independent
choice, however, once the parent chose to send their child to a private
who then [could]
school "checks [were] made payable to the 13parents
6
school.,
chosen
the
to
over
endorse the checks
137 The Pilot Program was implemented in the 1996-1997 school
year. By 2000, over 3,700 students participated in the program and
nearly 96% of those students enrolled in private religious schools. 138 Of
the fifty-six private schools that accepted tuition aid, "46 (or 82%)...
had a religious affiliation., 139 As a result, the face of the Pilot Program
appeared to overwhelmingly benefit private religious interests and a
group of Ohio taxpayers filed state14 and federal14 1 lawsuits alleging,

132. Id.at 645.
133. Id.
134. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645-46 (2002) (quoting OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West 2013)).
135. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (West 2013)). Under the
Pilot Program parents seeking tutorial assistance for children remaining in their
public school were responsible for scheduling a registered tutor and submitting
receipts to the state for re-imbursement. Id. at 646. Parents could receive up to 90%
of the amount charged for tutoring services or a maximum of $360. Id.
136. Id. at 646 (citing OHlo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.979 (West 2013)) ("Each
scholarship to be used for payments to a registered private school is payable to the
parents of the student entitled to the scholarship.").
137. Id. at 647.
138. Id.
139. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002).
140. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 9 (1999). The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the Pilot Program violated the Ohio State Constitution but
did not violate the U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause. Id.at 9, 17. However,
as the Zelman Court noted, the Ohio State constitutional provision at issue was a
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inter alia, that the Pilot
Program violated the First Amendment's
42

1
Establishment Clause.

Thereafter, the Ohio District Court 43 and the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that the Pilot Program violated the Establishment
44
Clause because it had the "primary effect" of advancing religion.'
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari4 4 and reversed the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding46 that the Pilot Program was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
1. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by
applying the re-developed Lemon test from Agostini, explaining that to
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny a government aid program must
47
not have the "'purpose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion."
Because the Pilot Program was enacted to aid the education of lowincome students in a "demonstrably failing public school system,"
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Pilot Program had a valid secular
purpose and the only Establishment Clause question was whether the
Pilot Programs had the "'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion."'
To determine whether the program's "effect" was one that
advanced religion, the Court analyzed the Pilot Program against Mueller,
Witters, and Zobrest, cases where the Court had previously upheld
government aid that reached "religious schools only as a result of the
procedural defect that was immediately cured by the Ohio Legislature. Zelman, 536
U.S. at 648.
141. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 741-42 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (granting preliminary injunction to Pilot Program but holding that program
likely violated the Establishment Clause and granting preliminary injunction to
enjoin the Superintendent from continuing the program); Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court holding that the Pilot
Program violated the Establishment Clause because it had the "primary effect" of
advancing religion).
142. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648 (2002).
143. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
144. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
145. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976, 976 (2001).
146. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S 639, 662-63 (2002).
147. Id.at 648-49.
148. Id. at 649.
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genuine and independent choices of private individuals. ' The majority
reasoned that because the Pilot Program provided government aid to a
broad range of parents in Cleveland, who were then free to direct their
aid to numerous public and private educational institutions on a nondiscriminatory basis, the Pilot Program was one of "true private choice"
like those of Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, and not readily susceptible to
Establishment Clause challenge.15 ° Furthermore, the amount of aid
conferred by the government raised no constitutional issue,15' nor did the
152
fact that 96% of vouchers were directed to private religious schools.
Rather, any "incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the
perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable
to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with
the disbursement of benefits."'
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's result but wrote a
concurring opinion that provides additional context for application of the
"true private choice" test. 154 In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the "true
private choice" test largely turned on "whether beneficiaries of indirect
aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious
149. Id.
150. Id. at 653-54.
151. Id. at 651. ("Five Members of the Court, in separate opinions, emphasized
the general rule from Mueller that the amount of government aid channeled to
religious institutions by individual aid recipients was not relevant to the
constitutional inquiry."). Justice O'Connor's concurrence also noted that while the
state would spend millions of dollars on their voucher program these figures "pale[]"
in comparison to other areas of coordinated government subsidies to religious
interests upheld by the court, such as religious organizations' non-exempt status for
income tax purposes, and charitable deductions for corporations, trusts, and estates
to "qualified religious groups." See id. at 665 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658. Even though the vast majority of voucher
recipients were Catholic parochial schools, the Zelman majority reasoned that "no
reasonable observer familiar with the history of the Establishment Clause" would
believe a neutral program of private choice carries with it the "imprimatur" of
government endorsement. Id. at 654-55.
153. Id. at 652.
154. See id. at 663-76. The majority also addressed the genuineness of choice
available under the Pilot Program. See id. at 655-56.
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,,155

organizations when determining
where to direct their aid. For Justice
O'Connor, a "genuine choice" did not require that public school options
be equal to or superior to religious ones in every way, only that there
were "adequate substitutes' ' 56 to religious schools available to parents
under the aid program. Thus, the fact that a majority of schools accepting
vouchers were religious private schools was not dispositive because the
voucher could still be used in a multitude of public and private
educational institutions, inside and outside of Cleveland. 57
3. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, 1 8 Justice Stevens, 159 and Justice Breyer' each
filed dissenting opinions in Zelman; however, Justice Souter's dissent is
most relevant to North Carolina's voucher law. In his opinion, Justice
Souter criticized two of the criterion
in the majority's "true private
16
choice" test: neutrality and choice. 1
As a preliminary concern, Justice Souter found the amount of aid
($2,250 per student) to be an unconstitutional departure from Everson's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.' 62 Likewise, Justice Souter
believed the majority's reliance on Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest was
inappropriate. 163 Justice Souter explained that while the Pilot Program
shared some common features with the programs at issue in these cases,
the aid approved by these programs was "isolated "'64 and "unlikely to

155. Id.
at 669 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (emphasis added).
156. Id.at 670-71.
157. Id.
158. See id.at 686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting).

159. See id.
at 684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 717-29 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
161. Id.at 695-96.
162. Id. at 689-90. In Justice Souter's opinion, Everson was still the guiding
principle in measuring the amount of government aid conferred to religious schools
under the Establishment Clause. See id. at 689-90 (Souter, J., dissenting). See id
(noting that no Justice disagreed with the basic Establishment Clause rule laid down
in Everson); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (citing the basic rule

from Everson).
163. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 694-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164. Id.at 694.
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afford substantial benefits to religious schools." 165 Moreover, even in
contemporary cases like Agostini and Helms, where the aid was
systematic,16 assistance was "never significant enough to alter the basic
fiscal structure of religious schools. 167 Here, unlike Mueller, Witters,
Zobrest, Agostini, or Helms, many of Ohio's private religious school
budgets were being supported entirely by vouchers 168 and plans to
169
expand the Pilot Program were already afoot.
Next, Justice Souter criticized the bare formality of the
"neutrality" and "choice" prongs in the majority's "true private choice"
test. 17 For the majority, the Pilot Program satisfied "neutrality" simply
because vouchers were made available to "all schools" public and
private, religious and non-religious. 71 Conversely, Justice Souter
focused on the effects of the Pilot Program and asked "whether the
scheme favors a religious direction., 172 In his opinion, when considering
the likely effects on "all schools," the criterion could not be classified as
neutral. 173
Much like neutrality, for the majority the Pilot Program offered a
"choice" for parents simply because they were free to direct their aid to
"all schools" public and private, religious and non-religious. 174 Again,
165. Id. at 688; see also supra note 8 (noting Zelman's dramatic expansion in
government aid).
166. Id. at 714 (Souter, J. dissenting).
167. Id.
168. See id. (citing People for the American Way Foundation, A Painful Price,
5, 9, 11 (Feb. 14, 2002) ("[O]f 91 schools participating in the Milwaukee program,
75 received voucher payments in excess of tuition, 61 of those were religious and
averaged $185,000 worth of overpayment per school, justified in part to 'raise low
salaries."')).
169. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 714 (citing Bloedel, Bill Analysis of S.B. No. 89,
124th Ohio Gen. Assembly, regular session 2001-2002 (Ohio Legislative Service
Commission)) (noting that private religious school administrators lobbied the Ohio
State Senate to increase vouchers from $2,250 to $4,814 per student, the total
amount of per pupil spending in public schools in Ohio).
170. Id. at 696-700.
171. Id. at 696-97.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 697-98 (emphasis in original). For example, a public school
student applying for tutorial aid to remain enrolled at his current public school would
receive only $360 whereas the same student applying for a voucher to a private
religious school could receive up to $2,250. Id.
174. Id. at 699.
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Justice Souter believed the Establishment Clause required more,
explaining that the legitimacy of an aid program was not based simply on
whether money passed through private hands but also, "whether the
private hand is genuinely free to send the money in either a secular
direction or a religious one." 7' 5 In his opinion, the Pilot Program did
not-and perhaps could not--create "genuine" choice for parents in
Cleveland because of the economics of private school education and the
logistics of enrollment. 176 Thus, for the overwhelming majority of
voucher recipients in Cleveland, their only practical alternative to public
school was a private religious school.
In sum, the Zelman majority held that the Pilot Program was
enacted with a valid secular purpose and was one of "true private
choice." Thus, its "effects" on religion, like Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest were merely "incidental" to the advancement of religion. By
harmonizing the Pilot Program with the indirect aid programs upheld in
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest as opposed to direct aid programs, the
majority resurrected the direct/indirect distinction the plurality seemed to
abandon in Helms. 177 Moreover, by categorizing the Pilot Program as a
form of indirect aid, the majority largely avoided any analysis of
"entanglement," a Lemon factor that was merged into the "effects" prong
78
of Agostini, but not abandoned altogether.1
Conversely, Justice Souter's dissent found the Pilot Program
unconstitutional in two ways. First, the amount of aid was a dramatic
departure from prior precedent.179 Second, the "true private choice" test
was overly reliant on formal categories of "neutrality" and "choice,"

175. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 699.
176. See id at 705. On one hand, the value of a school voucher ($2,250) was
not enough, in itself, to fund tuition at a private non-religious school (around
$4,000). Id. at 705. Thus, for private non-religious schools to qualify as "genuine"
choices for parents, the program's funding would have to be increased, furthering
Justice Souter's Establishment Clause worries, see supra Part Ill.D.3(a), or parents
would have to pay the difference, an unlikely outcome since eligibility for the
program required income 200% below the poverty line. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646
(majority opinion). On the other hand, even if the school voucher did cover private
non-religious tuition, none of the participating private non-religious schools had
capacity to enroll voucher students in their schools. Id.at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 815-16 (2000) (plurality opinion).
178. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part III.D.3.
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which were self-serving and served no practical utility outside of the
More importantly, Justice Souter viewed Cleveland's
abstract.
problems prospectively, looking beyond the "unprecedented" facts in
Zelman into the ripple effects school vouchers could cause for the
Establishment Clause doctrine. 181 As Parts IV and V illustrate, Justice
Souter's concerns have now reached fruition in the substance of North
Carolina's Opportunity Scholarship Program.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA'S OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

A. Legislative History
For the first time in 150 years, North Carolina entered the 2013
legislative session with a Republican majority in all three branches of
state government. 82 By summer's end, the General Assembly had
enacted a series of conservative reforms impacting North Carolina's
election,' 83 abortion,' 84 and education laws. 85 Many of these reforms led

180. Id.
181. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority has not
approved vouchers for religious schools alone, or aid earmarked for religious
instruction. But no scheme so clumsy will ever get before us, and in the cases that
we may see, like these, the Establishment Clause is largely silenced.... I hope that a
future Court will reconsider today's dramatic departure from basic Establishment
Clause principle [sic].").
182. North Carolina's 2013 Legislative Session Recap: Landmark Gains for
Conservatism, NCCIVITAS.ORG (July 30, 2013), http://www.nccivitas.org/2013/2013legislative-session-recap.
183. On August 12, 2013, Governor Pat McCrory signed into law the Voter
Information Verification Act ("VIVA"), a law that requires North Carolina voters to
show photo identification at election polls, eliminates same day registration and
reduces the early voting period from seventeen days to ten days. See Voter
Information Verification Act, N.C. Sess. Laws 2013-381 (2013) (codified in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-166.13). Subsequently, the United States Department of Justice
brought suit against North Carolina under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arguing that
VIVA unfairly discriminates against minorities in elections. See Hunter Schwarz,
Justice Department sues North Carolina over voter ID law, WASHINGTONPOST.COM
2013),
7,
(July
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/07/j ustice-departmentsues-north-carolina-over-voter-id-law.

2015]

N.C. OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP

403

to impassioned public debate, national news coverage, and forms of civil
disobedience not seen since the 1960's Civil Rights era.'86
Among the General Assembly's
,, ,, 187education reforms was the
Opportunity Scholarship Act ("O.S.A. ),
an education bill with a
stated purpose to further the "sound basic education" of all students,
reduce the achievement gap, and improve the quality of education for the
State of North Carolina.' 88 Sponsors of the O.S.A. proposed to use $10
million of tax revenues to fund a private scholarship program for lowincome families to use as tuition at private "non-public" schools in North
Carolina. 189 The O.S.A. was referred to both the Education and
Appropriations Committees but was never officially voted on as a standalone bill. 190 Rather, the substance of the O.S.A. was added to the
Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act
("Appropriations Act"), a spending bill designed to provide funding for
184. During the 2013 legislative session, House Bill 695, entitled the Family,
Faith and Freedom Act, proposed to hold North Carolina abortion clinics to the same
regulations as ambulatory centers and allow health care workers to opt out of
performing abortions if they held a moral objection. Family, Faith and Freedom Act,
H.R. 695, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013). Ultimately, House Bill 695 was unable
to pass both the House and Senate as a stand-alone bill and was attached to Senate
Bill 353, an otherwise unrelated motorcycle safety bill. Health and Safety Law
Changes, S.353, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013). Senate Bill 353 was signed into
law by Governor McCrory and is codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.3. See Juliet
Eilprien, N.C. Gov. McCrory signs anti-abortion bill into law Monday night,
WASH1NGTONPOST.COM
(July
29,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/29/nc-govmccrory-signs-anti-abortion-bill-into-law-monday-night.
185. Along with House Bill 944, the Opportunity Scholarship Act discussed
infra, the North Carolina General Assembly also proposed to end public teacher
tenure. See Excellent Public Schools Act of 2013, Senate Bill 361, 2013-2014 Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2013).
186. See generally Anne Blythe, Largest Moral Monday Crowd Yet Floods
Downtown Raleigh, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (July 29, 2013),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/07/29/3068037/largest-moral-monday-crowdyet.html (recounting the unprecedented crowds and public demonstrations in Raleigh
during the 2013 legislative session).
187. North Carolina Opportunity Scholarship Act, House H.R. 944, 2013-2014
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/
Bills/House/PDF/H944v0.pdf.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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the state budget during the 2013-2014 fiscal years.' 9 Thus, with little
public debate, on July 26, 2013, Governor Pat McCrory signed the
Appropriations Act into law, and funding for the newly created
"Opportunity Scholarship Program" was procured for the 2014-2015
school year.
B. Mechanics of the Opportunity ScholarshipProgram
The Opportunity Scholarship Program ("O.S.P.") is codified in
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-562.1-562.7. Pursuant to statute, the State
Educational Assistance Authority ("the Authority") is empowered to
make scholarship grants of up to $4200 available to families with
"eligible" students to use at qualifying "non-public schools."'1 92 Each
year a list of all "non-public" schools located in North Carolina is
required to be provided by the State.1 93 Currently, there are 696
registered "non-public" schools in North Carolina, composed primarily
of religious and non-religious private day schools, although the
financing, tuition, curriculum, staff, and facilities of these schools are
widely disparate.194 Applicants are eligible to receive scholarship funds if
they meet two requirements.' 95 First, the applicant must meet one of five
criteria, whether (1) a full time student assigned to and attending public
school in the previous semester, (2) received a grant in the previous year,
(3) entering kindergarten or first grade, (4) is in foster care, or (5) was
adopted within one year.' 96 Second, the recipient must reside in a
household with an aggregate income at or below 185% of the federal

191. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of
2013, Senate Bill 402 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (ratified as 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 360
Law 2013-360).
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-562.2(a)-(b) (2014).
193. Id. at § 115C-562.2(a) ("The Authority shall make available no later than
February 1 annually applications to eligible students for the award of scholarship
grants to attend any nonpublic school. Information about scholarship grants and the
application process shall be made available on the Authority's Web site.").
194. Report, Characteristicsof North Carolina Private Schools (preliminary
findings), Children's Law Clinic, Duke University Law School, February 2014, 6
(on-file with author).
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. §1 15C-562.2(a) (2014).
196. Id. at § 115C-562.1(3)(a).
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poverty line, not in excess of 133% of the amount required to qualify for
97
federal free or reduced lunch ($43,568 for a family of four). 1
Once individual eligibility for a scholarship grant is established,
198

the Authority determines scholarship priority for disbursement.
Initially, students enrolled in the O.S.P. during the previous academic
year receive priority.' 99 However, at least 50% of scholarship funds must
be disbursed to students at or below the threshold to qualify for federal
free and reduced lunch and no more than 35% of scholarship funds can
be awarded to students entering kindergarten or first grade.' °° All
remaining funds are to be distributed to eligible applicants pursuant to
rules and regulations established by the Authority.2 0' The Authority is
also charged with certifying all non-public school compliance and
facilitating remission of scholarship funds to recipients. 20 2 Non-public
schools have six fundamental obligations to receive scholarship money 203
and as to remission, the Authority is required to send a scholarship
payment certificate directly to the private school where at least one of the

student's parents or guardians is required to endorse the certificate before
the funds can be deposited into the school's account. 204
Originally, the O.S.P. contained no anti-discrimination clause 205
and by implication, there was no statutory barrier for non-public schools

197. Id. at § 115C-562.1(3)(b).
198. Id. at § 115C-562.2(a).
199. Id. at § 115C-562.1(3)(a)(1).
200. Id. at § 115C-562.2(a)(2)(a)-(b).
201. Id. at § 115C-562.2(a)(2)(c)-(d).
202. Id. at § 115C-562.4, 562.6.
203. Id. at § 1 15C-562.5(a)(1)-(6). The Authority must insure that non-public
schools: (1) provide documentation of tuition fees charged to students, (2) conduct a

criminal background check of "all staff members with highest decision making
authority," (3) provide annual written reports on students progress, (4) administer a
nationally standardized test at least once a year, (5) provide documentation of

graduation rates, and (6) contract with a Certified Public Accountant to conduct an
annual financial review, if the school accepts over $300,000 of scholarship money in
a school year. Id. Non-public schools have three additional ministerial obligations

that are immaterial to the purposes of this paper listed in §I 15C-562.5(b)-(d).
204. Id. at § 115C-562.6.
205. North Carolina Opportunity Scholarship Act, H.R. 944, 2013-2014 Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2013), availableat http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/
House/PDF/H944v0.pdf. See id at § 115C-562.2 (noting proposing statute without
absence of an "anti-discrimination" clause within original statute).
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to give preference to eligible students on the basis of race, religion, or
national origin. However, in the midst of implementing the O.S.P
(discussed more fully in Part IV.C), the North Carolina General
Assembly amended the original statutory language, adding a new section
entitled "Opportunity Scholarship Grant Clarifications" that includes a
206
non-discrimination clause. The newly amended section provides that a
"non-public school shall not discriminate with respect to categories listed
,207
This section of the federal code prevents
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)."
origin," but does not
discrimination based on "race, color, or 1.national
• 208
"non-public"
Therefore,
religion.
on
based
preclude discrimination
schools accepting voucher money in North Carolina are not precluded
from discriminating among recipients based on religion.
209
the
Furthermore, much like the Pilot Program in Zelman,
funding
voucher
in
an
expansion
General Assembly also contemplates
and widening eligibility criteria for voucher applicants in subsequent
years of the program. The fiscal note accompanying the original
Opportunity Scholarship Act predicted that the initial $10 million
funding the program will be increased to $40 million after year one and
$50 million in subsequent fiscal years. 21 Whereas the original threshold
for income eligibility under the O.S.P. was at or below 185% of the
211
poverty line, or an annual income of $43,568 for a family of four in
2013, subsequent years of the O.S.P. widen eligibility standards by one

206. See The Current Operations and Capital Improvement Act of 2014, S.B.
744, § 8.25(d) (2014) (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-562.5(cl)).
207. Id.
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2014) ("No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
209. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 714-15 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
210. N.C. GEN. ASSEMB. FISCAL RESEARCH DIVISION, Legislative FiscalNote:
The Opportunity Scholarship Act, House Bill 944, 52 (2013), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/FiscalNotes/House/PDF/HFN0944v2.pdf
[hereinafter O.S.A. Fiscal Note]. The chart located on page 2 of the O.S.A. Fiscal
Note illustrates how the income eligibility for the O.S.P. will grow after the 2013-14
fiscal years.
211. This is the limit for eligibility for federal free and reduced lunch. Child
Nutrition Programs, Income Eligibility Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 19179 (2013).
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third to include families at or below 246% of the poverty line,21 2 or an
annual income of $58,683 for a family of four in 2014. 2 13 Thus, after the
first year of implementation, many more middle class parents with
children enrolled in public schools will be able to claim vouchers and
direct them to non-public schools.
C. Implementation of the Opportunity ScholarshipProgram
While plans for the implementation of the O.S.P. materialized,
the legal debate surrounding the constitutionality of the law intensified.
Opponents of the O.S.P. criticized the wisdom of imparting such an
important shift in education policy as part of a voluminous budget bill
with very little opportunity for public comment. 214 In response, multiple
215
citizen lawsuits were filed, challenging the validity of the O.S.P. under
Article I, V, and VII of the North Carolina State Constitution.
211
One of these citizen suits is Hart v. North Carolina. In Hart,a
group of twenty-five North Carolina residents alleged, inter alia, that the
O.S.P. unconstitutionally appropriated tax funds exclusively reserved for
a "uniform system of free public schools" and that schools receiving
such appropriation were free to discriminate on the basis
217 of race, sex,
national origin or religion in their selection of students.
In February
2014, Wake County Superior Court Judge William Hobgood granted a
preliminary injunction enjoining implementation of the O.S.P. until after
resolution of the lawsuits and on August 21, 2014, Judge Hobgood
entered an order ruling that the O.S.P violated North Carolina's
218
Constitution.
212. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §115C-562.1(3)(b) (multiplying the federal reduced
lunch limit (185%) by 133% equals new eligibility limit of 246%).
213. Child Nutrition Programs, Income Eligibility Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg.
12467 (2014) ($44,123 (185% of federal poverty level) times 133%). The O.S.A.
Fiscal Note charts the expected fiscal impact from enhanced Scholarship Grants
spanning until the 2017-18 fiscal years. O.S.A. Fiscal Note, supra note 210, at 11.
214. See Amended Complaint at 8, 37-38, Hart v. North Carolina, No. 13CVS-16771 (D. N.C. Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Hart Complaint].
215. See id.; Complaint, Richardson v. North Carolina, No. 13-CVD-16484
(D. N.C. Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Richardson Complaint].
216. See, e.g. Hart Complaint, supra note 214.
217. Id. at 13-16.
218. See Transcript of Proceedings at 7-8, Hart v. State of North Carolina,
(Aug. 21, 2014) (No. 13- CVS-6771) available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/
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In his order, Judge Hobgood ruled on state law grounds that the
O.S.P. drained public schools of necessary funding and operated to deny
students a "sound basic education" as required by Leandro v. North
219
Carolina. More importantly, Judge Hobgood found that the O.S.P.
religion. 22 0
allowed non-public schools to discriminate based on
Immediately following the ruling, North Carolina filed their notice of
Hart is under consideration in the North Carolina
appeal and currently
221
Supreme

Court.

Judge Hobgood's Superior Court Order is important to a future
federal First Amendment Challenge for two reasons. First, the parties did
not raise or litigate any Establishment Clause allegations in their
complaint and Judge Hobgood's "religion" holding was largely in the
context of equal protection under North Carolina constitution, not the
Federal Establishment Clause. Second, Judge Hobgood's finding that the
O.S.P. allows for discrimination based on religion seems to directly
implicate the "non-discrimination" requirement in the "true private
choice" test under Zelman.
In sum, Part IV illustrates how the context and substance of the
O.S.P. differ from the Pilot Program in Zelman. As a consequence, as
Part V explores, a different Establishment Clause outcome may be
expected, if and when, the O.S.P. is challenged in federal court.

s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1279134/nc-ruling.pdf

[hereinafter

Hart

Transcript]; Jane Stancill and Colin Campbell, NC Supreme Court Will Take Up
School Voucher Appeal, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, October 10, 2014,
http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/10/10/4222443_nc-supreme-court-will-takeup.html?rh= 1.
219. See Hart Transcript, supra note 218, at 7-8. Hart v. State of North
Carolina, (Aug. 21, 2014) (No. 13- CVS-6771) available at https://
s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1279134/nc-ruling.pdf.
220. Id.at 4-5. ("The Court finds from the record beyond a reasonable doubt
that the Opportunity Scholarship Program funds a system of private schools from
taxpayer dollars as an alternative to the public school system in direct contravention
of the North Carolina Constitution, Article 1, Sections 15 and 19, with respect to
religion, and that with respect to religion of the declaration of rights, Article 9,
Sections 1, 2, (1), 6, 7 (V) and the public purpose clause of Article 5, Section 2 (1)
and Section 2 (7).").
221. See Stancill and Campbell, supra note 218.
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V. NORTH CAROLINA'S OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

A. Jurisdictionfor an Establishment Clause Claim
Two jurisdictional issues could pose potential barriers to
challenging the O.S.P. in federal court: standing and preclusion. As Part
V.A explains, both issues would likely be litigated, but neither issue
should conclusively bar adjudication in federal court.
The Supreme Court has generally recognized that taxpayer
lawsuits are non-justiciable in federal court because they assert,
"generalized grievances" that are common to the electorate as a whole
and lack the particularity to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirements for
222

223

the Court recognized a
However, in Flast v. Cohen,
standing.
limited exception to the taxpayer standing rule, holding that a taxpayer
may still achieve standing if they can demonstrate "a 'logical link'
between the [plaintiffs taxpayer status] 'and the type of legislative
enactment attacked . . ." and a "nexus' between [such taxpayer's] status
and 'the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."', 224 In
subsequent cases, the Court has construed the Flast exception
narrowly. 225 However, the Court's most recent addition to the taxpayer
standing doctrine may have a direct impact on standing in future voucher

cases.
222. See e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Doremus v. Bd. of
Ed. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
223. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
224. Id.
225. See e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587
(2007) (plurality opinion) (holding that President George W. Bush's Faith Based
initiative program did not meet the Flast exception because it was an executive
ministerial program, not a Congressional spending program); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (holding that conveyance of property made by the United States G.S.O was
not a Congressional spending program); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974) (holding that a taxpayer's lack of information from CIA spending failed Flast
because the CIA's spending was not Congressional spending); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (holding Congressman
serving as Army Reservists failed Flast because it challenged an executive decision
not Congressional spending decision).
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In Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, a
majority of the Court held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge
whether Arizona's "tuition tax credit" violated the Establishment Clause
because the tax credit was not a legislative spending program and
therefore failed the first prong of Flast.227 Because challenges to state
228

voucher programs have historically been brought by taxpayers,
commentators have questioned whether a taxpayer challenging a state's
221
voucher program could now survive both Flast and Winn.
Although Winn leaves the standing issue unsettled, a litigant
challenging North Carolina's voucher legislation on Establishment
Clause grounds in federal court would still likely have standing. Even
though the Court has construed the Flast exception narrowly, 230 if a
petitioner has alleged an Establishment Clause violation that is derivative
2311
Here,
of legislative spending program, Flast does not bar standing.
232
unlike Winn and other antecedent cases where standing was denied
33
a litigant challenging North Carolina's voucher legislation
under Flast,2

would assert a challenge to the Appropriations Act, a spending program

226. 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
227. Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1447-49.
228. See e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398-99 (Fla. 2006) (parents of
elementary and secondary students brought suit as taxpayers); Simmons-Harris v.
Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 9, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211 (1999) (citizens and teachers unions
brought suit in their individual and representative capacity as taxpayers). Of course
standing is ordinarily not a problem when voucher cases are bought at the state level
because most state declatory acts provide standing for constitutional challenges.
And, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), the only voucher case to
reach the Supreme Court, taxpayer standing was not an issue.
229. Compare Bruce R. Van Baren, Tuition Tax Credits and Winn: A
Constitutional Blueprint for School Choice, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 515, 515-16
(2012) (arguing that standing may preclude taxpayers from litigating voucher cases
and state school choice programs) with Isabel Chou, "Opportunity"for All?: How
Tax Credit Scholarships Will Fare in New Jersey, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 332 n.85
(2011) (arguing that because Winn was the first tax credit program to reach the
Supreme Court that the Court's rationale may deviate from the Court in Zelman).
230. See supra note 225.
231. See supra note 225.
232. In Winn, the Court found that Arizona's tax tuition credit did not meet the
Flast exception because the program was authorized under the state's authority to
tax, not spend. Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1447-49.
233. See supra note 225.
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authorized by the North Carolina's General Assembly, 234 along with a
235
colorable Establishment Clause violation ,
to meet the essential
elements for standing under the Flast exception. Accordingly, standing
should provide no bar to a North Carolina taxpayer asserting an
Establishment Clause challenge in federal court.
A second jurisdictional concern to federal adjudication is the
preclusive effect of state court proceedings. If the North Carolina
Supreme Court ultimately overturns Hart, plaintiffs would likely then
file a complaint in federal district court raising an Establishment Clause
2 36
violation to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
While no such federal claim was raised in state court, two closely related
issues regarding religion were litigated and decided by Judge Hobgood at
237
the superior court level. As a result, North Carolina might try to assert
that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel precludes litigation on the religion
3s
altogether.'
issue
234. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing the legislative history of North Carolina's
voucher legislation, culminating in passage of the Appropriations Act by the General
Assembly).
235. See infra Part V.B (analyzing the Establishment Clause issues in North
Carolina's voucher legislation).
236. In fact, this would be the only available avenue to litigate the federal
Establishment Clause issue. Because the federal issue was not raised in state court,
plaintiffs cannot appeal a final judgment in the North Carolina Supreme Court to the
United States Supreme Court. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 638
(1875) (establishing the long-standing jurisdictional principle that the Supreme
Court has no appellate jurisdiction to review final judgments in state supreme courts
that turn solely on state law issues).
237. See supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
238. See Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323,
336, n.16 (2005) (explaining that "[u]nder collateral estoppel, once a court has
decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the
first case."). It is also conceivable that resjudicata could be raised as an affirmative
defense by North Carolina in a subsequent federal challenge. See id. (explaining that
"[u]nder res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in
that action."). However, this defense is likely to fail because the doctrine requires
that the "same parties" attempt to re-litigate a claim that was previously decided in a
court proceeding. Since voucher challenges are ordinarily taxpayer lawsuits, a new
taxpayer harmed by the voucher legislation, not involved in the original state
proceeding, could easily file the lawsuit to avoid the effect of res judicata on the
federal claim.
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Although a collateral estoppel claim is cognizable, it is not likely
to succeed for two reasons. First, while North Carolina's Constitution
mimics the United States', equal protection under North Carolina's laws
and establishment of religion under the U.S. Constitution are separate
and distinct issues. Second, even though the North Carolina ruling was
litigated and will be "actually decided," it still may not be "necessary" to
the North Carolina Supreme Court's forthcoming holding. Therefore,
North Carolina would be unlikely to meet all of the required elements for
collateral estoppel and a federal court is likely not precluded from
reaching the merits of a future Establishment Clause challenge.
B. Substance of the Establishment Clause Claim
The Zelman Court began its Establishment Clause inquiry by
applying the "purpose and effect" test utilized in Agostini.239 In Agostini,
the Court collapsed the traditional three-prong Lemon test into a broader
inquiry that asks only two Establishment Clause questions: (1)does the
so
challenged government program have a valid secular purpose, and if 240
religion?
advance
program
(2) does the effect of the government
Under Agostini's "effects" prong, a court is instructed to balance three
factors: (1) whether aid is likely to lead to government "indoctrination,"
(2) whether recipients are defined by religion, and (3) whether aid leads
241
to "excessive entanglement" between the government and religion.
After Agostini, the plurality in Helms explained that the "effects"
prongs often overlap and the primary criterion for a court to consider is
242
"indoctrination," which largely turns on the neutrality principle.
Furthermore, the Helms Court noted that where a government aid
program provided "genuine and independent" private choice, neutrality
243
was satisfied. However, this proposition also applies in the inverse,
such that where a government aid program does not provide a "genuine
239. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648-49 (2002); Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).

240. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23.
241. Id. at 234.
242. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000); see also supra notes
109-119 and accompanying text.
243. See Helms, 530 U.S. at 809-10; supra notes 109-119 and accompanying
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and independent" private choice, it ceases to be neutral, the
"indoctrination" prong may go unsatisfied and other factors such as
"entanglement" become salient. On balance, the Court may find the
government program's "effect" advances religion, and violates the
Establishment Clause.
Herein lies the problem. The Zelman Court expanded the
singular focus of Helms, "genuine and independent private choice," into
its broader "true private choice" test for the purposes of a school voucher
analysis. And, as the Zelman Court explained, the "true private choice"
test is satisfied if a voucher program: (1) provides direct aid to a broad
class of beneficiaries, (2) in a non-discriminatory fashion, (3) neutral to
religion, and (4) results from the "genuine and independent" private
choice of citizens. 2 4 As a result, the Zelman Court reasoned that when
the "true private choice" test is met, the "effects" prong of Agostini is
also met.245

However, in Zelman only a slim 5-4 majority found the Pilot
Program actually met the "true private choice" test while a strong group
of dissenters reached the opposite result.246 Likewise, because resolution
of the "true private choice" test informs "indoctrination," the primary
inquiry in the "effects" test, the Zelman majority gave short shrift to
247
other potential "entanglement" issues vouchers might present.

244. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
245. See id.at 649, 653-54.
246. Cf supra Parts III.D.1-3. It is also important to note the reasons for
marginalization of the "excessive entanglement" element of the "effects" test. In
Agostini, the Court ultimately found the absence of indoctrination more compelling
than any potential "entanglement issues." See supra notes 94-104 and
accompanying text. However, the factors giving rise to "excessive entanglement"
were still discussed at length by the Court.
See supra notes 94-104 and
accompanying text. Similarly, in Helms, "excessive entanglement" played no part in
the rationale. Not because it was irrelevant but because it was not affirmatively plead
by the plaintiffs counsel. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Therefore,
while the Court's ultimate focus on indoctrination may have been appropriate in
Agostini and the plaintiff's tactical decision may have been appropriate in Helms,
outside of these two circumstances excessive entanglement is still a cause for
concern. See, e.g., Part V.B.2 (b) (analyzing possible "entanglement" issues within
the O.S.P).
247. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63 (finding that Ohio's program was neutral
with respect to religion and allowed individuals to exercise private choice, but
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Therefore, outside of the unique facts in Zelman, a school voucher
and "entanglement"
program may fail to satisfy both the "indoctrination"
248
Agostini.
in
test
"effects"
prongs of the
Accordingly, for North Carolina's O.S.P. to survive
constitutional scrutiny under both Agostini and Zelman, it must be
enacted with a valid secular purpose and fulfill each of the "true private
choice" factors. If the O.S.P fails the "true private choice" test then other
remaining prongs of the "effects" test may be needed to resolve whether
or not the program advances religion and violates the Establishment
Clause. Parts V.B. 1-2(a) explores the former while Part V.B.2 (b)
explores the latter.
1. "Valid Secular Purpose" Prong
The stated purpose of North Carolina's O.S.P. is to reduce the
achievement gap and enable families with limited financial resources to
249
Voucher opponents would
choose among educational alternatives.
for
the O.S.P. because North
likely argue that there was no pressing need
Carolina schools are not failing to the same degree as Cleveland's school
district in Zelman. While empirical evidence supports this assertion,25 °
ultimately enactment of a voucher law is a policy decision made by
democratically elected officials, not a constitutional one for a federal
judge. Moreover, in nearly every case addressing aid to religious schools
purpose251
over the past fifty years the Court has found a valid secular

stopping short a full analysis addressing the issue of entanglement between the state
and religion).
248. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Parts 1V.A-B.
250. See North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, How Do North
Carolina Public Schools Measure Up? (last updated Oct. 2014), available at
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/data/reports/education-data/other/measureup.pdf. The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction reports that North
Carolina has a four-year high school graduation rate of 83.9% and an annual drop
out rate of 2.45%. Id. These figures, while not comprehensive, still demonstrate the
stark difference in the prevailing educational climate in Cleveland when Zelman was
decided. Cf supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text (noting the extreme
education issues the Ohio legislature faced prior to enactment of the Pilot Program).
251. See supra Part Ill (noting that all major cases decided by the court turned
on the challenged program's effect not its secular purpose).
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and as Justice Souter noted in Zelman, it is unlikely the Court would ever
have a serious challenge to this prong because "no scheme so clumsy
will ever get before us." 252 North Carolina's O.S.P. would likely fair no
differently. However, the crux of the constitutional analysis turns on
whether the O.S.P. has the "effect" of advancing religion, discussed in
Part V.2.
2. The "Effects" Prong
253
a. Application of the "True Private Choice " Test

As a preliminary matter, there may be cause for concern in the
methodology used to transfer voucher funds from North Carolina to
eligible parents. In Zelman, participating schools did not directly receive
voucher funds. 254 Rather, eligible parents received a check from Ohio
that they were then free to use for "tuition aid" at a participating school
or "tutorial aid" at their existing school. 255 Unlike Zelman, the O.S.P.
directs the authority to remit money directly to the non-public school of
the parents choice where parents are then required to appear at the
campus and physically endorse the check before any disbursement of
funds occurs. 256 Therefore, although the school cannot gain access to the
money until the parent endorses the check, the parent has no actual
tangible control over use of voucher funds.
On the surface, this provision is likely an administrative
necessity, however, it does seem to undermine a parent's "genuine
private and independent choice," the underlying logic for the result in
Zelman. However, the plurality in Helms seemed unconcerned with this
252. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
253. For brevity this section omits any analysis of the "broad beneficiaries"
prong. To the extent this issue bears on resolution of the "true private choice" test,
the O.S.P. is made available to parents of low-income parents whose children are
currently enrolled in public schools across the state. See id.at 654-55 (majority
opinion) (finding that this factor was easily filled). There is no reason to believe it
would have serious bearing on the constitutionality of the O.S.P.
254. See supra note 125-128 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text.
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issue, passing on a formalistic requirement for transmission of funds,
noting that "[a]lthough the presence of private choice is easier to see
when aid literally passes through the hands of individuals ...there is no
reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a form. 257 While the
"form" alluded to in Helms may not be "required" by the Establishment
Clause, the fact that the O.S.P. creates a system where funds go directly
to private religious schools, not parents, may be salient on balance with
other competing factors to a future court. Likewise, forced systematic
interactions between parents and administrators of religious schools
tighten the nexus between the state and religion and could also bring
Therefore, this factor of the "true
"entanglement" issues to bear.
private choice" test would likely receive some scrutiny by a court but
could easily be blended into a comprehensive analysis of other
competing factors.
The first major requirement under the "true private choice" test
is that a voucher program be non-discriminatory.259 In Zelman,
discrimination was not at issue amongst the Justices because the Pilot
Program explicitly required that "[p]articipating private schools must
agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic
background. ,260 However, North Carolina's O.S.P. does not have a
261
Originally, the O.S.P. included no anticomparable restriction.
discriminatory clause, however, the law has since been amended to
prohibit discrimination based on "race, color, or national origin," 262 but
not religion. Thus, non-public schools accepting vouchers in North
Carolina are free to discriminate based on this category and private
religious schools may, without penalty, give preference to members of
257. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000). The Court went on to note
that "[t]o the extent that respondents intend their direct/indirect distinction to require
that any aid be literally placed in the hands of schoolchildren rather than given
directly to the school..., the very cases on which respondents most rely, Meek and
Wolman, demonstrate the irrelevance of such formalism." Id at 817.
258. See infra Part V.B.2.b (discussing the implications of "entanglement"
issues on the overall "effects" of a religious aid program).
259. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653-54 (2002) (explaining
that the nondiscriminatory prong requires that there are no incentives for religious
schools over nonreligious schools).
260. See id. at 645.
261. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
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the patron faith over non-believers in the admission process, a fact that
did not escape Judge Hobgood in North Carolina Superior Court. 263
In fact, the potential for voucher discrimination already exists. In
Hart v. State of North Carolina, plaintiffs exposed discriminatory
patterns among multiple eligible religious non-public schools in North
Carolina. For example, Raleigh Christian Academy's admission process
requires parents to sign a "Doctrinal Agreement" that confirms
•• 264parents
are "in 100% agreement" with the church's doctrinal positions. As to
their doctrine, the school states that it is affiliated with a Baptist Church
and:
is open to all those of like-faith of doctrines held
by the our church ...

we are not a church school

for those in cults, i.e., Mormons, Jehovah Witness,
Christian Science, Unification Church, Zen
Buddhism,
Unitarianism,
and
United
Pentecostal. 65
Moreover, while other religious non-public schools have
admission policies that are less overt than Raleigh Christian Academy,
they still maintain criteria that would allow discrimination based on
religion. For example, Greensboro Islamic Academy maintains an
admission policy that bars discrimination based on "sex, age, race, color,
national or ethnic origin, or disability," but not religion.266 Furthermore,
other existing private religious non-public schools require an affirmation
of religious faith as a condition of enrollment. For example, Freedom

263. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
264. Exhibit 5, Hart v. State of North Carolina, (No. 13-CVS-16771) (on-file
with author). Exhibit 5 contains pages printed from Raleigh Christian Academy's
website, http://www.raleighchristian.com. For the purposes of footnotes 264-267,
each of the exhibits cited were authenticated by Seonaid A. Rijo from the NC Justice
Center. See Affidavit of Seonaid A. Rijo, Hart v. State of North Carolina, (No. 13CVS-16771) (on file with author).
265. Exhibit 5, Hart v. State of North Carolina, (No. 13-CVS-16771) (on file
with author) (alteration in original).
266. Exhibit 1, Hart v. State of North Carolina (No. 13-CVS-16771) (on file
with author). Exhibit I contains pages printed from Greensboro Islamic Academy's
website at http://www.giaschool.com.
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Christian Academy, located in Fayetteville, North Carolina, states that
admission criteria largely hinges on:
An acceptance of Jesus Christ as Lord by the
student and one of the parents (or legal guardian),
are active in a local church or seeking a church
home, or families who are open to the teachings of
the gospel.267
Accordingly, the O.S.P. provides no bar for religious non-public
schools to discriminate against non-believers or non-affiliated families
unwilling to make an affirmation of faith. Therefore, North Carolina's
current voucher regime likely falls short on the non-discrimination prong
of the "true private choice" test.
The second component of the "true private choice" test is
neutrality. In Zelman, the majority held that the Pilot Program, a statespending program providing for the transfer of individual vouchers worth
$2,250 per student per year, where 96% of the vouchers directed to
private religious schools, was neutral to religion. 268 In the majority's
opinion, because vouchers reached parents indirectly, only after the
private choice of many individual parents, vouchers did not break with
269
other "in-direct" aid cases validated by the Court. Likewise, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence noted that the $8.2 million dollar sticker price
of the Pilot Program was not dispositive because the amount "paled" in
comparison to other government subsidies conferred to religious entities
outside of the educational context.2 7 °
The Zelman dissent reached the opposite conclusion, holding
that the Pilot Program was an unconstitutional departure from the basic
premise of Everson.27 1 The dissenters argued that the value of the aid
approved in the principle cases relied on by the majority, Mueller,
Witters, and Zobrest, related only to small personal payments to
267. Exhibit 4, Hart v. State of North Carolina (No. 13-CVS-16771) (on file
with author). Exhibit 4 contains pages printed from Freedom Christian Academy's
website at http://www.fcapatriots.org.
268. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 151.
271. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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"individuals" whereas a voucher program required a coordinated and
systematic transfer of millions of dollars to hundreds of private
individuals. 272 Furthermore, the dissenters believed that the majority's
rule would open the floodgates to the state coffers, noting at the time
Zelman was decided, Ohio already had preliminary plans to expand the
Pilot Program in subsequent fiscal years."'
In North Carolina, as Justice Souter predicted in his Zelman
dissent, "the money has barely begun to flow. ' 27 4 First, in year one of the
O.S.P. the General Assembly provides for a $10 million dollar spending
program and individual vouchers worth $4200, nearly double the amount
approved in Zelman.275 Second, like the Ohio legislators in Zelman, the
North Carolina General Assembly also has existing plans to increase
aggregate funding for the O.S.P. and loosen eligibility requirements
during subsequent fiscal years. 276 By 2017 the O.S.P. will be funded at
$40 million per year, individual vouchers will be worth $5500 per
student and vouchers will be available to most middle class families. 7
When these factors are taken into account, the primary purpose of the
Pilot Program in Zelman and the stated purpose of the O.S.P.-enhanced
educational choice for low-income families in underperforming
schools-is eviscerated.
Therefore, the real neutrality question for a future court becomes
this: at what point does the sheer amount of money conferred by
vouchers become an Establishment Clause issue? While both the
majority and dissent in Zelman made compelling arguments to this point,
ultimately Zelman was a close case and the context and substance of the
O.S.P. manifest all of the trepidation predicted by the Zelman dissent and
dismissed by the majority. Thus, a pragmatic future court could be
persuaded to favor Justice Souter's rationale and hold that the O.S.P.
fails the neutrality prong, especially in light of where the money is
6 278
"actually" flowing in North Carolina.
272. See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
274. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 714 (2002) (Souter, J.,

dissenting).
275. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
277. See id.
278. See supra notes 275-285 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the most critical component in Zelman's "true private
choice" test is whether or not a voucher recipient has a "genuine and
independent" choice among "adequate non-religious" public or private
279
In Zelman, the Court held that parents
educational alternatives.
accepting vouchers under the Ohio Pilot Program had a "genuine" choice
when they were presented with a myriad of "non-religious" educational
options to Cleveland public schools. 28° Parents could accept tuition aid
and enroll their child in a public community or magnet school within
their existing district. 28 Alternatively, parents could accept "tuition aid"
a
and send their child to a public school in an adjacent school district or282
choice.
their
of
school
non-religious
private religious or
Unsurprisingly, the Court found these options more than "adequate" and
trumpeted Ohio's approach for what it was: a multifaceted effort to
improve the quality of education in a demonstrably failing school
district.
Unlike Zelman, North Carolina's O.S.P. limits parents to two
options: (1) accept voucher funds for use at a "non-public" school, or (2)
in their current public school without financial
remain • enrolled
283
In North Carolina, non-public schools are defined by
assistance.
statute, and like Zelman, include both religious and non-religious private
options. 284 However, for all practical purposes the "non-religious" option
is mostly unavailable to North Carolina parents. For example, in many
279. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
280. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653, 662 (stating that "[t]he program permits the
participation of all schools within the district, religious or nonreligious" and "[i]t
permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and
private, secular and religious."); supra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
281. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653, 662.
282. Id.
283. See supra Parts IV.A-B (explaining the legislative history and mechanics
of North Carolina's voucher legislation). It is important to note that the O.S.A.'s
Fiscal Note provides tentative plans to pass along any "cost savings" from the O.S.P.
to certain public school programs. O.S.A. Fiscal Note, supra note 210, at 15
("Section 6 of the bill states the General Assembly's intent to appropriate funds to
public schools for assistance to at-risk students and to community organizations
serving the educational needs of at-risk students still enrolled in public schools
beginning in FY 2014-15 in an amount equal to the cost savings created by the
award of opportunity scholarship grants.").
284. See supra Parts IV.A-B (explaining the legislative history and mechanics
of North Carolina's voucher legislation).
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rural districts the only alternative to a public education is a private
religious school and in many cases
there may be only one such institution
1
to choose from in that locality.

1

Inversely, in larger metropolitan districts, where incomes are
higher and educational options are enhanced, North Carolina's voucher
law suffers from the same "cost" fallacy Justice Souter illustrated in his
286
dissent. In North Carolina, vouchers are worth $4,200 per year and the
287
average cost of a "non-public" education is $6,690 per year. Recent
studies by the Children's Law Clinic at Duke University's Law School
indicate that a voucher will cover full tuition in around 38 percent of
non-public schools and "[o]f those schools whose tuition could be met
,,288
with a voucher payment, 92 percent are religious.
Moreover, in
Zelman the effects of the cost fallacy were largely dismissed by the
majority for a good reason: parents who were priced out of private nonreligious schools could still rely on at least five other educational
alternatives. 289 In North Carolina, when logistical or economic barriers
remove the practicality of non-religious private schools, the "Hobsonian"
effect is all but guaranteed and the "choice" rationale collapses.
Therefore, a good argument can be made that North Carolina is not
providing "adequate non-religious" options in their voucher program and
the "genuine and independent" prong of the "true private choice" test is
unfulfilled.
Thus, on balance, a future court forced to examine the
Establishment Clause issues presented in Parts V.B. 1-2(a) supra, lacking
any binding case law interpreting Zelman, would likely find that North
Carolina's O.S.P. has a valid secular purpose but that facts exist to bring
the transfer of voucher funds, "non-discrimination," "neutrality," as well
as the "genuine and independent" prongs of the "true private choice" test
into question. As a result, as Part V.B.2.b discusses, a future court would
285. See Report, supra note 193, at 3. The Children's Law Clinic at Duke
University Law School also reports that there are 13 North Carolina counties with no
private schools and "18 counties with just one private school." Id. Moreover, "in
those 18 counties, the single private school is religious." Id.
286. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 699-714 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 157 and accompanying text.
287. See Report, supra note 193, at 3.
288. See Report, supranote 193, at 3.
289. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 699-714 (2002) (Souter, J.,dissenting); see also
supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
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likely not be able to escape a deeper analysis of "entanglement" issues
presented by the O.S.P., that were290not at issue in Zelman, but are reticent
in North Carolina's voucher law.
b. "Excessive Entanglement:"Forgotten Element of the "Effects" Test?
In Agostini the Court blended Lemon's "excessive entanglement"
prong into a broader analysis of a government program's "effect;" it did
not abandon the prong altogether. 29 1 Rather, the Agostini Court held that
a government aid program might have "excessive entanglement" with
religion if the program required: (1) pervasive monitoring, (2)
292
administrative cooperation, or (3) resulted in political divisiveness.
However, most of the contemporary confusion surrounding "excessive
entanglement" originates from the Court's holding in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, a case that did not even turn on an
291
entanglement issue but was heavily relied on by the Agostini Court.
In Zobrest, the Court held that the presence of a governmentfunded sign language interpreter, employed to assist in the instructional
needs of a hearing impaired student attending a private religious school,
did not advance religion because the interpreter would "neither add to
nor subtract ' ,294 from the educational environment and the presence of an
"different from that of a teacher or guidance
interpreter 29was
', 5
counselor.
Subsequently, in Agostini, the Court overturned Aguilar,
abandoning its presumption that public employees would naturally
inculcate religion, as a matter of law, largely based on the Court's
296
tolerance of the interpreter in Zobrest. Thus, the Court recognized that
implementation of New York's Title I program posed no greater risk
290. See infra Part V.B.2.b.
291. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. In essence, Agostini did
not turn on either the second or third prongs of "excessive entanglement" -only the
"pervasive monitoring" consideration. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 206

(1997).
293. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-32; Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509

U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
294. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
295. Id.
296. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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than the risk posed by the interpreter in Zobrest and determined that
"pervasive monitoring" was unnecessary for a Title I program filled by
part-time instructors, teaching secular subjects, with conduct enforced
through "unannounced monthly visits ''297 by administrators, where no
298
issues had ever been reported.
Furthermore, "excessive entanglement" arguments were not
raised in Helms because the government program required educational
aid, mostly
content, to be "secular, neutral, and
• •
• multi-media
299
nonideological"
dissolving any need for a "pervasive monitoring"
scheme. Likewise, "pervasive monitoring" was unnecessary in Zelman
because of the Pilot Program's onerous "anti-discrimination" and "nonhatred" clauses, which were essentially self-policing. 30 0 However, North
Carolina's O.S.P. does not necessarily fit the same rationale as Zobrest,
Agostini, Helms, or Zelman, and if the "true private choice" test fails, a
30 1
deeper "entanglement" analysis should be undertaken.
First, as the plaintiffs in Hart articulated, non-public schools in
North Carolina have vastly different standards of accountability than
ordinary public schools. 3°2 For example, non-public schools are not
required to be accredited "by the State Board of Education or any other
state or national institution. ' ' 30 3 Likewise, non-public schoolteachers are
not required to have "any particular credentials, degrees, experience, or
expertise in education," 3 04 although they are largely full-time employees
charged with the primary instruction of children. Non-public schools are
also not "required to monitor, evaluate, or measure the performance of
their teachers in any way., 30 5 In fact, the O.S.P. does not even require

297. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
298. Id.at 226-27.
299. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 796 (2000).
300. See supra Part IlI.D.1.
301. See supra Part V.B (explaining the logical sequence of events in the
Establishment Clause analysis if a voucher program were to fail the "true private
choice" test).
302. See Hart Complaint, supra note 214, at
44-62.
303. See Hart Complaint, supra note 214, at 45.
304. See Hart Complaint, supra note 214, at 47.
305. See Hart Complaint, supra note 214, at 47.
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a,,306
"criminal background check" prior to
to conduct
non-public schools
.
,, .
hiring any "teacher or employee.
Moreover, textbooks circulated in some private religious nonpublic schools raise additional "entanglement" questions outside the
scope of Zelman. For example, the Social Studies textbook, UNITED
307
STATES HISTORY IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE,

is widely used in North

30 8

Carolina religious schools and includes a section entitled "The Rise of
Cults. ' 30 9 In this section, the author examines the "rise of religious cults,"
or as the textbook described it: "counterfeit church groups that operate
under the guise of Christianity." 310 Among the "cults" listed in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE are "Mormonism, Jehovah's Witnesses and
'
Another section of CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE is
Christian
entitled "Cultural Decay" which implies that the "increased acceptance
313
'
have
of homosexuality" 312 and tolerance of "alternative lifestyles"
eroded American society.
In sum, the lack of accountability under North Carolina's
voucher scheme is in stark contrast to the Pilot Program in Zelman.
Moreover, unlike the limited risks of indoctrination or entanglement
stemming from the single sign-language interpreter placed in a private
religious school in Zobrest, 1 4 the administration of a part-time,
"supplemental" Title I services in Agostini,3 15 or the placement of non316
secular multi-media equipment in Helms, without additional statutory
306. See Hart Complaint, supra note 214, at 49. It is also important to note
that non-public schools are required to conduct a background check for "staff
members with the highest decision-making authority." See Hart Complaint, supra
note 214, at 49.
307. MICHAEL R. LOWMAN, UNITED STATES HISTORY IN CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVE (3rd ed. 2012) (on file with author).
308. Frances Patterson, Teaching Religious intolerance, RETHINKING SCHOOLS
(Winter 2001-2002) availableat http://www.rethinkingschools.org/
special reports/voucher-report/vinto162.shtml (identifying A Beka Books as one
of the three major U.S. Protestant textbooks publishers).
309. Lowman, supra note 307, at 185.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See id.at 557.
313. See id.
314. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 88-99.
316. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.

2015]

N.C. OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP

425

assurances like the "non-hatred" 317 clause in Zelman, "pervasive
monitoring" of the O.S.P. may in fact be necessary to prevent the
"excessive entanglement" of religion and curtail impermissible
advancement of religion at the taxpayer's expense.
V. CONCLUSION

"The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. 3 18 Although the
Court has chosen to erect a low wall in the context of school vouchers, it
has still erected a wall nonetheless. As Parts II and III explained, in the
context of aid to religious schools, the Supreme Court has departed
tremendously from the original principle set forth in Everson.319 But,
during the preceding fifty years, expansion was always incremental, and
until the sympathetic facts of Zelman, never in a context that threatened
the integrity of the doctrine. 320 However, as Part IV illustrated, North
Carolina's O.S.P. was adopted against fundamentally different
educational and political realities than the Pilot Program in Zelman.
Accordingly, as Part V argued, the substance of the O.S.P is
distinguishable from the Pilot Program in Zelman and validation of the
O.S.P. under the "true private choice" rationale pushes the proposition to
its logical extreme.
Notwithstanding the concerns raised in this paper, the Court has
yet to grant certiorari in another voucher case to correct, clarify, or
solidify their position in Zelman and there is no cause to suspect that they
have any immediate interest in filling the void. Moreover, even if the
O.S.P. were to reach the Supreme Court, it is unclear whether the Court
would rigidly follow the "true private choice," test, default to the broader
Agostini test, or fashion a new remedy altogether. For now, "Zelman
joins an infamous class of decisions that includes Plessy v. Ferguson and
Lochner v. New York. Perhaps,
as with Plessy and Lochner, Zelman one
32 1
overturned.,
be
day will
317. See supra note 100.

318. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
319. See supra Part 111.
320. See supra Part II1.
321. Jason S. Marks, What Wall? School Vouchers and Church-State
SeparationAfter Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,58 J.MO. B. 354, 362 (2002).

